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TEACHING RESTITUTION

Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer*
When I began teaching in 1981, I was assigned two separate Remedies
courses to teach during the fall: (1) Equitable Remedies and (2) Legal and
Extraordinary Remedies. For the Equitable course, I chose the text Leavell,
Love & Nelson, Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages (3d ed.
1980) and for the Legal and Extraordinary course, York and Bauman,
Remedies (3d ed. 1979). I was not sure what "extraordinary remedies" were
ifthey were not equitable remedies, so I assumed they must be this topic called
restitution. Of course, most people refer to equitable remedies as the
extraordinary ones, and my two Remedies courses were shortly thereafter
combined into one, called, unsurprisingly, Remedies. Ever since then, however,
the topic of restitution has intrigued me.
I did not remember studying restitution in law school. When I looked back
at my law school notes, I discovered that I had, and had even read Moses v.
Macpherlan.'Apparently, however, neither the subject matter nor its oldest
case had made an impression on me. In fact, it was not until I tried to reduce
Moses to a note for the 6th edition of Equitable Remedies, Restitution and
Damages,2 that I think I began to understand it. (I had always left it out of my
syllabus before.) My note on Moses, which I had planned to make very brief,
now contains a very long excerpt from the case.
When I began teaching Remedies, I had not had time to prepare more than
the first six weeks of classes in advance. That preparation did not include
restitution. When I reached the first restitution case, the first student question
made me I realize that I did not know what this topic was about. My first
group of students and I struggled to make sense of it. From the cases in the
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York and Bauman text, my students and I derived a theory. Restitution was
different from contracts and torts because it measured recovery by
defendant's gain and could be a cause of action on its own with three
elements: (1) defendant's gain, (2) at plaintiff's expense, and (3)
circumstances which would make it unjust for defendant to retain the gain.
I continue to teach and write about restitution as a cause of action. This
is what Doug Rendleman in his thoughtful article, Common Law Restitution
in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did Smoke Get in Their Eyes, refers
to as "free standing restitution," the breadth of which troubles him and others?
The summer after I finished teaching restitution for the first time, I wrote about
restitution because I wanted to learn more about it and apply it in an unusual
way. I noted the critique of overbreadth, but also noted that years ago
Learned Hand and the Reporters of the Restatement of Restitution (1937),
Seavey and Scott, had countered the critique by arguing that restitution was no
more broad than, for example, the concept of the "reasonable person" (then
to as the "ordinary prudent man"), which had been refined by courts over
time.4
In this paper, I will discuss how and why I teach restitution to reach the
conclusion that restitution is "freestanding." I think this conclusion makes
sense theoretically, and practically I like the idea that it can "arise in a
bedazzling variety of situations."' In fact, I begin the unit on restitution with
a (somewhat, I hope) dramatic reading ofthe longer version ofthis quote from
Professor Douthwaite. I will attempt to do in this paper what I do in class,
build a chart ("The Chart") in the form of a matrix that first, describes how
restitution fits within the context of a Remedies course and second, arrives at
the conclusion that restitution is not a remedy, but a cause ofaction. Iwill also
question, as I do in class as The Chart is being built, whether restitution really
can be so easily categorized. I will also explain, however, why feminist
concerns propel me to conclude that "freestanding restitution" is a valid legal
theory.
I have a three-credit Remedies course, which is taught in two eightyminute segments per week for fourteen weeks. The class often has
approximately 100 students. I devote four classes to introducing restitution.

I 33 GA. L. REv. 847, 886(1999).

4 See CANDACE S. KOvACIC, Applying Restitution to Remedy a DiscriminationDenial of
Partnership,34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743, 769-73 (1983).
' GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO REsTIrTION § 1.1 at 3 (1977).
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Those four follow nine classes on equity and contempt and another five on
damages. The latter five include comparisons between remedial theory in
contract and tort. Ithen, following the organization of the textbook, introduce
in a variety of contexts the concept of an attorney helping a plaintiff choose
among options-between equity and law, and among theories ofcontract, tort
or restitution. I emphasize that every cause of action, including those created
by statute, potentially has a law-versus-equity option, but that either the facts
of the case or the restrictions in a statute may limit that choice. In addition, I
emphasize that the other remedial theories that are introduced throughout the
course may (or should) be found at the remedial stage of all litigation.
Throughout the course the students and I discuss how Remedies is a course
about a society's values-how a society is willing to encourage or discourage
conduct by determining what remedy will be allowed-how values and thus
remedies might change over time--and how all societies may not have the
same values and thus might reach different remedial conclusions.
I introduce restitution by asking the students to identify its confusing
abundance ofterminology. Iask the students to call out words ofrestitution's
terminology. I get a list that includes most, if not all of the following:
assumpsit
implied contract
contract implied in fact
contract implied in law
quasi contract
quantum meruit
unjust enrichment
These words will eventually appear on "The Chart."
I then ask the students to compare the terminology used in two cases:
Kossian v. American NationalInsurance Co.6 andBastianv. Gafford! In
Kossian an owner of an inn contracted to pay Kossian $18,900 to clean up
debris from the inn's having burned. That owner, Reichart, became bankrupt
and lost the inn to the defendant, who later collected money from the company

6
7

62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
563 P.2d 48 (Idaho 1977).
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that had insured the inn against fire. Some portion of the sum collected
included reimbursement for cleanup costs. Kossian sued the later owner of
the inn for payment for his work. (The defendant was an insurance company,
but in Kossian its role was not as an insurer, but as a company that had
acquired real estate. The insurance company that had insured the inn against
fire was not a party to the suit.) The trial court dismissed Kossian's suit on the
ground that there was no privity of contract between Kossian and the later
owner of the inn.
In Bastian,Bastian had orally agreed with Gafford to construct an office
building on Gafford's land. After Bastian prepared the plans, a dispute arose
as to how the project was to be financed and how Bastian was to be paid.
The building was later planned and built by someone else. Bastian sued
Gafford for payment for his plans, but the trial court dismissed the suit on the
ground that the defendant, Gafford, had not been enriched because he did not
use Bastian's plans. Both cases were reversed.
I ask the students what the causes of action were inKossianandBastian.
The students will answer unjust enrichment or restitution in Kossian and
breach of a contract implied in fact in Bastian. I ask why Kossian is not a
breach of contract case. (No privity.) IfKossian is not a breach of contract
action, then what is the significance of unjust enrichment? The answer is that
it must be a cause ofaction. There is no other theory that would have enabled
Kossian to sue the owner of the property--tort does not apply. This, then,
introduces "freestanding restitution."
To pursue the theoretical underpinnings of both cases, I ask whether the
students have seen any inconsistencies between the two appellate cases. I
also say that, for many practitioners, the law they will practice after they
graduate will be self-taught. One method of self-teaching is learning the
terminology. One way of doing that is to see how the courts define the terms
(and learn when the courts, and not the reader, are confused). The students
compare the following paragraphs from Kossian and Bastian:
The court in Kossian said:
Plaintiff ... relies upon the basic premise that defendant should not be
allowed to have the fruits of plaintiff s labor and also the money value of that
labor. This, of course, is a simplified pronouncement of the doctrine ofunjust
enrichment, a theory which can, in some instances, have validity without
privity of relationship. The most prevalent implied-in-fact contract
recognized under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is predicated upon a
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relationship between the parties from which the court infers an intent.
However, the doctrine also recognizes an obligation imposed by law
regardless of the intent of the parties. In these instances there need be no
relationship that gives substance to an implied intent basic to the "contract"
concept, rather the obligation is imposed because good conscience dictates
that under the circumstances the person benefitted should make
reimbursement....
Plaintiff's claim does not rest upon a quasi contract implied in fact but upon
an equitable obligation imposed by law.... 8

The court in Bastian said:
In basing its decision on unjust enrichment, the trial court failed to
distinguish between a quasi-contract and a contract implied in fact. Although
unjust enrichment is necessary for recovery based upon quasi-contract, it is
irrelevant to a contract implied in fact. For appellant to recover under the
latter theory, it is not necessary that respondent either use the plans or derive
any benefit from them. It is enough that he requested and received them
under circumstances which imply an agreement that he pay for appellant's
services... 9

I approximate an outline of those paragraphs on the board as follows:
Kosslan

I. The doctrine of unjust enrichment
A. Quasi contract implied in fact
-relationship from which to infer
intent
B. Obligation imposed by law

Basdan

The need to distinguish between I. quasi
contract and I. contract implied in fact
1

implied in fact
-unjust enrichment irrelevant
I. services requested

-no intent

2. services received

-good conscience

3. circumstances implying agreement to
pay plaintiff

-person benefitted should make
reimbursement
"Plaintiff's claim does not rest upon a
quasi contract implied in fact"

* Kossian, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
9 Bastian, 563 P.2d at 49.

662

BRANDEIS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 39

It becomes clear that Kossian'sdiscussion of contract implied in fact, is
inconsistent with Bastian. I ask the students how they might know, without
further research, which court is correct. That leads to a discussion of the
difference between dictum and holding. The trial court in Kossian had
dismissed plaintiff s case because there was no contract between Kossian and
the defendant. The first theory in Kossian, therefore, is "mere dictum, your
honor." The appellate court inKossiandetermined from the facts ofthe case
(holding) that the defendant had been unjustly enriched by receiving both
Kossian's cleanup work and some insurance money to reimburse cleanup
costs. The fire insurance company had settled with the defendant for an
amount less than the total value of the loss. The court remanded for a
determination of the percentage of the insurance proceeds that would cover
the cost of cleanup to measure defendant's gain. Kossian did not recover his
contract price from the contract he made with the now bankrupt, former
owner of the property; rather, he recovered the "unjust" portion of the
defendant's enrichment. It was unjust because the defendant has a double
recovery.
Since the trial court in Bastianhad dismissed the plaintiff's case because
the defendant had not been unjustly enriched, it becomes apparent that the trial
courts should have exchanged theories. The appellate court in Bastian
remanded for Bastian to prove the existence of a contract implied in fact, a
real contract. The students see that three elements in the Bastian column
above could be rewritten as offer, acceptance and consideration. At this point
I explain, with the help of a long excerpt from Moses, the historic
development of the terminology. That history explains the use of contract
terminology in non-contractual situations. I lament that this terminology causes
unnecessary confusion for lawyers and judges.
The class then reviews (with another case) the difference between an
express contract and a contract implied in fact. The difference is not the
difference between an oral and a written contract; rather, it is the difference
between a contract where the terms are expressed, either orally or in writing,
and one where the terms are inferred from conduct. I ask the students, if two
parties had intendedtoform a contractbut had not discussed the price term,
how a court can measure the amount of nonpayment for services rendered.
I lead students to the word "intent" and to the court's "inferring" from the
conduct of the parties that they must have "intended" the unspoken price term
to be the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services. Thus, at this point,
reasonable market value of plaintiffs services is seen as a contract remedy
and defendant's gain is seen from Kossian as a restitutionary remedy. This
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then becomes the beginning of The Chart:
Cause of
Action

Restitution

Contract (express or implied in
fact)

Tort

Elements

Defendant's gain

Offer

Duty

Plaintiff's loss

Acceptance

Breach of Duty

Unjustness

Consideration
Capacity

Remedy

Defendant's gain

Expectation (court infers parties
intend price term to be reasonable

Make plaintiff
whole

market value if the term is not
expressed)
OR
Reliance

Then the class studies four cases to consider how to measure defendant's

gain in restitution cases. The cases do not produce a uniform theory as to
recovery, leading to the questions "what really is restitution?" and "is my chart
accurate?" In the famous egg washing case, Qiwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
the students see that a plaintiff was able to "waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit" and recover the amount of a defendant's gain that was greater
than plaintiff's loss." By contrast, in Maglica v. Maglica, the court said:
[The threshold requirement that there be a benefit from the services can lead
to confusion, as it did in the case before us. It is one thing to require that the
defendant be benefited by services, it is quite another to measure the
reasonable value of those services by the value by which the defendant was
"benefitted" as a result of them."

But that is exactly what I have said restitution does measure, the amount of
defendant's gain. Maglica involved a suit by a female cohabitant against a
male cohabitant. The jury had awarded the woman $84 million, half of the
value of the defendant's business, for which she had worked and contributed
10 Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
" Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, at 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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profitable ideas, but in which she did not have a formal ownership interest.
One of her ideas--that the company make purse-sized flashlights in different
colors-was very successful. The trial court had instructed the jury that it
could measure recovery by the reasonable value of her services or by the
amount by which the defendant had benefited from them. The intermediate
appellate court, quoted above, appeared amazed at the amount of the verdict.
Although the intermediate appellate court noted that the case was one under
the theory of unjust enrichment for which a contract was not required, the
appellate court limited the remedy to the reasonable value of her services,
which, as has already been established, is a contract implied in fact remedy.
The students discuss whether Maglicaand Qiwell are inconsistent, and
if so, which one is wrong. Should the measurement be defendant's gain, and
is Maglicawrong? Or are the cases distinguishable, and is the distinguishing
feature tortiousness, present in Ciwell but missing in Maglica? Should the
determination whether defendant's gain can exceed damages in tort or
contract be limited to historically defined torts, or can it encompass
"unjustness" more broadly defined? Who was more wrongful, the person who
took an idle machine, albeit someone else's, out of a closet to deal with labor
shortages during wartime, or the male cohabitant who left the relationship a
wealthy man, in substantial part because ofthe ideas of his female cohabitant.
(A feminist perspective creeps in here--one can note that the measurement
ofdefendant's gain was allowed inOlwell,but not when it would be awarded
to a woman in her traditional role of a person behind the scenes, and without
the protection of formal title, "owning" the business, or the "protection" of
marriage.) How does restitution for material breach of contract fit with
notions of wrongfulness for the purpose of restitution?
The class discusses two more cases about the measurement of recovery
in restitution. W.H. Fuller Co. v. Seater is similar toKossian in that the
person for whom the plaintiffcontracted to work is no longer in possession of
the property and the worker is suing the owner of the property who did not
contract for the work.12 Seater,however, did not involve a double payment
to the defendant. The defendant did not contest the trial court's findings of a
contract implied in law; rather, he argued, successfully on appeal, that the
plaintiff's recovery must be limited by the defendant's gain and not be
measured by the reasonable value of plaintiff's services as it had been in the
trial court. InSeaterthe court remanded for a determination of"which, ifany,

12

W.H. Fuller Co. v. Seater, 595 N.W.2d 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
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of Fuller Company's services benefited Seater."" Thus, using the
measurement of defendant's gain can be useful to a defendant when there is
little or no gain. (Ifthere is no gain, however, there should not be an action in
restitution.) Seater contrasts with Maglica, which held that in order to use
unjust enrichment there must be a gain, but that gain is not the measurement
of recovery.
One possible interpretation ofOlwell, Maglicaand Seaterwhen they are
read together is that the recovery can never measure defendant's gain if that
gain is higher than another measure of recovery unless the conduct is tortious,
or unless the defendant's gain is less than the reasonable value of plaintiff's
services. In May v. Watt, however, the Ninth Circuit said, "If a new trial is
held on rescission, and the quantum meruit damages are greater than those
already awarded for breach of contract, May will be entitled to the additional
amount."' 4 May involved a designer who had contracted to design a
condominium complex but who wanted his name taken off of the project
because the developer, contrary to the contract, was not adhering to May's
designs. May wanted more than his contract price, which he claimed had been
discounted because of the publicity he would receive. The Ninth Circuit,
however, did not give guidance as to how to measure defendant's gain, which
might be higher than the contract price, other than to say that May could not
use a fixed percentage of the cost of building.
After comparing these cases, the students debate whether restitution can
at times provide a plaintiff with a greater recovery than the plaintiff could
recover in contract or tort, regardless of the tortiousness of the conduct or
whether restitution should be more limited. As with the scholarship on the
subject,the student's debate does not always conclude with consensus. For
purposes of my theoretical view of restitution, I like to think that not only is
restitution a cause of action, but also that it measures recovery by the value of
the defendant's gain. Such a theory makes a nice, clean distinction among
restitution, contract, and tort. But is it correct? After reading these cases
involving the defendant's gain, one might have to put a question mark under the
recovery section for restitution.
We then study equitable restitution. We read some constructive trust,
equitable lien, and subrogation cases. Since equitable relief is a court order to
the defendant to do or not do something, the students are directed to the

SId
'

at 100.

May v. Watt, 822 F.2d 896, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).
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language in the cases in which the defendant is ordered to "convey" something
to the plaintiff. The tracing cases are thus understood in the context of the
defendant having to convey to the plaintiffwhat is the plaintiff's, distinguishing
the plaintiff from other general creditors. After discussing these cases, the
students return to Kossian to determine whether Kossian is a legal or an
equitable action. The students can see from the last substantive sentence in
Kossianthat despite all of the "equitable" terminology used by that court, the
award is "then plaintiff should recover," not "defendant is ordered to pay
Kossian."15 Thus, in the context of restitution, the class reviews the
differences between law and equity in general. This helps them see that those
differences remain constant regardless of the cause of action in which they are
applied.
At this point I add to The Chart, under each of the three causes of action,
a legal and an equitable option. Under both of those options, I add the
terminology that is limited to one or the other. For legal restitution the
terminology includes contract implied in law, quasi contract, assumpsit,
quantum meruit, and other common counts. Quasi contract and contract
implied in law are synonymous, but quantum meruit and the other common
counts are limited to certain specific factual circumstances, e.g., quantum
meruit refers to services provided. The terminology for equitable restitution
includes constructive trust, equitable lien, and subrogation. On the chart, I also
fill in the terminology for legal and equitable contract and tort, although there
are fewer synonymous terms ofart because I do not teach any historical writs
other than assumpsitand quantum meruit. I add those two terms to the legal
contract column, pointing out that the words can have one of two meanings
because they appear in both the legal restitution and contract columns. In the
classes on damages the class had already learned that "foreseeability" has
different meanings depending upon whether used in tort (proximate cause) or
contract (contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting). Equitable
terminology under contract is specific performance, and under tort, injunction,
but all equitable relief is an order by the judge to the defendant to do or not do
something, despite its label. By adding these words to The Chart, I should
have accounted for all ofthe terminology that was listed on the board during
the first class (and explained its historical roots). The Chart is now:

11Kossian, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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Contract (express or

Action
Type of
Action
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Tort

implied in fact)
Legal:

Equitable:

Legal:

Equitable:

quasi-

construc-

assumpsit

specific

injunc-

contract

tive trust

quantum

perform-

tion

contract in

equitable

law

lien

assumpsit

subrogation

meruit

Legal

Equitable

ance

quantum
meruit

(other
common

counts)
Elements

Defendant's gain

Offer

Duty

Plaintiff's loss

Acceptance

Breach of duty

Unjustness

Consideration
Capacity
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Remedy

Amount of
defendant's

Convey
defendant's

Expectation

Order
defendant

gain

gain

(contract

to

implied in

perform

fact
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Make plaintiff
whole

-

infer
parties
intend
price to be

reasonable
market
value of
plaintiff's
services)

OR
Reliance

Finally we study the defenses to restitution, reading cases involving
volunteers, lack of expectation of payment and other defenses. While the
courts in some of these cases apply an expansive view of restitution in
rejecting a defense, there are others that apply a restrictive view of restitution
by applying a defense expansively. Those latter cases appear to have a
disparate impact on women. Many involve the need to compensate a
nonwage earner for his or her contributions to the total wealth of a marital
relationship. There are a number of cases that deny relief, or grant it stingily,
to women. I would callMaglica,discussed above, a "stingy recovery" case.
Thus, from the feminist perspective, I would like to see those cases decided
under the more expansive view of restitution.
In Verity v. Verity, the court denied a wife a constructive trust on one-half
of her husband's property, which she had been managing during his mental
incapacity, on the ground that she had a duty to perform services for her
husband. 6 The court did, however, award her an equitable lien to cover her
out of pocket expenses, presumably because her duty did not extend to
spending money. In Dusenka v. Dusenka, the court denied compensation,
on the ground of lack of expectation of payment, to a widow who had been

16

Verity v. Verity, 191 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
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working in what she thought was her husband's business, but which her
husband had transferred to her stepson prior to his death." Verity and
Dusenka are older cases, but even in a more recent case, Kuder v.
Schroeder, a court denied any recovery to a former wife.' InKuder, the
wife and husband had agreed that if she had only one child and supported the
family while he was in school (undergraduate through law school) he would
then support the family and she could be a full time wife and mother. They
divorced shortly after he started working. The court denied recovery because
of the spouse's duty to support the other, "which may not be abrogated or
modified by agreement of the parties to a marriage."' 9 Unfortunately the
dissolution of marriage laws did not help the wife because the couple had
accumulated few assets during the marriage and she had no right to alimony
because she was not "dependent." The dissenter said:
Arguably, as previously discussed, plaintiff's contribution to defendant's
educational accomplishments is outside the scope of her marital duty of
support, and therefore is not presumed gratuitous. However, even assuming
that her contribution falls within such duty, the allegations in plaintiff's
complaint are sufficient to rebut the presumption that her efforts were
rendered gratuitously. Based on the allegations in her complaint, I conclude
that plaintiff has stated a claim for unjust enrichment, and would hold that the
trial court erred in dismissing it.2"

In Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, cited by the dissent in Kuder, a wife was able to
recover in restitution. 2' She and her husband had agreed that after she put him
through law school, he would put her through a master's degree. In what I
would view as another "stingy recovery" case, the court restricted the wife's
recovery to the cost of her education if it were less than the defendant
husband's gain (the cost of law school) because "the award to [her] should be
limited to the amount of the anticipated benefit to [her]." 22 The court,
however, had held that she could not recover under a contract claim because
the terms were too indefinite. This is similar toMaglica, in which the court

held that the measurement under unjust enrichment cannot be the value of
defendant's gain, but must be limited to the reasonable value of her services,

'
"

Dusenkav. Dusenka, 21 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1946).
Kuder v. Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).

19 Id. at 273.
20 Id. at 276 (Greene, J., dissenting).
21 Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
22 Id. at 207.
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apparently not recognizing that some of the gain that the business received was
from her idea to market purse-sized colorful flashlights.
Watts v. Watts, stands out as a cohabitant case that awarded defendant's
gain.2 3 Watts upheld an award to "Mrs." Watts of 10% of the $1,113,900
increase in wealth during the relationship on the ground that:
the jury could have inferred that [his having planned to leave her 10% of his
wealth in a prior will] was the value [he] placed on [her] services in 1972....
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Watts was
unjustly enriched by [her] efforts by $113,090.08, which is a little less than
$12,000 a year.24

Perhaps finding this a "stingy recovery," the court remanded for a
determination whether "Mr." Watts had breached a contract implied in fact to
share equally the increase in the wealth. Following Watts, thejury in Maglica
might not have been wrong in finding that the female cohabitant's contributions
to the defendant's business that they started together, including her profitable
ideas, justified that she share in the gain of the business.
These restrictive cases are contrasted with Oiwell, in which defendant's
gain was permitted to be more than the plaintiff's loss and with Ventura v.
TitanSports, Inc., in which now governor Jesse Ventura was able to recover
over $800,000, which the court said represented either the defendant's gain or
plaintiff's loss, for unauthorized and fraudulent use of Ventura's image in
videotape sales.2"
The defenses become limitations to the recovery in restitution, which I
compare to the limitations in contract, contemplation ofthe parties at the time
of contracting (referred to as foreseeability) and in tort, proximate cause (also,
unfortunately, referred to as foreseeability). I add to the bottom of The Chart
the following:

Watts v. Watts, 448 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
24

Id. at 297.

" Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Volunteer
No expectation of

Contemplation of
parties at time of

payment

contracting

Change of position
Third
Party

Duty to Mitigate
Offset the benefits

Proximate Cause
Comparative (or

contributory)
negligence
Avoidable
Consequences or
Duty to Mitigate

Fruits of
defendant's labor

Economic Loss
Rule

With the addition of the defenses and limitations, The Chart is complete.
(The completed chart is Appendix A to this paper.) On the completed chart
I draw a circle around defendant's gain as a remedy under restitution and from
that circle draw two arrows, one of which points to the remedy section under
contract, the other to tort. I explain that restitution is often referred to as an
alternative measurement of recovery for contract or tort, and thus restitution
(measured by defendant's gain) could also be listed at these two points. Since
it does not matter whether restitution is a cause of action or a remedy in these
two situations because the outcome is the same, it is not inaccurate to refer to
restitution as an alternative remedy. In fact, Lon Fuller and William Perdue,
in their famous article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages I,
distinguished among restitution, reliance and expectation as "three principal
purposes which may be pursued in awarding contract damages. 26 They also
say, discussing Aristotle, that "[t]he 'restitution interest,' involving a
combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain presents the strongest
'27
case for relief.
I ask, however, why restitution cannot be referred to only as a remedy.
As The Chart and cases such as Kossian demonstrate, restitution can be a
cause of action when no other would apply. I explain, because restitution can
stand alone, one can think of it in all cases in which it is applied as a cause of
action. Just as plaintiffs in some instances can choose between causes of
action in contract or tort to achieve different remedial goals, such as obtaining
punitive damages (tort) or taking advantage of a longer statute of limitations

26

Lon Fuller& William Perdue, The RelianceInterest in ContractDamages1, 46 YALE L.J.

52, 53-57 (1936).
17 Id. at 53.

672

BRANDEIS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 39

or easier proof of breach (contract) rather than negligence (tort), so too
plaintiffs can waive the tort (or material breach of contract) and sue in
assumpsit (restitution) to achieve a greater recovery (defendant's unjust
enrichment). When restitution is an alternative to a material breach of contract
action or a tort, that is because the "unjust" element in restitution either is the
material breach of contract, which enables the plaintiffto view the contract as
nonexistent, or is the tortious conduct. Thus, The Chart demonstrates three
independent causes of action and in doing so, emphasizes "freestanding"
restitution. That emphasis focuses attention upon the different measurements
of recovery under all three theories. With each remedy independently
measured, it is irrelevant whether defendant's gain is greater or less than the
other measures of recovery. It is merely different. When justice requires,
defendant should disgorge gain. Ofcourse, defining "when justice requires"
is not necessarily easy. I have, however, suggested one approach.
As the title of the first article I wrote, referred to above, 28 indicates, I
theorized applying restitution to remedy a discriminatory denial ofpartnership
to a female associate. I wrote the article after the 11 th Circuit, in Hishon v.
King & Spaulding, had ruled that discrimination in partnership decisions
against associates was not covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.29 The United States Supreme Court later reversed that decision,30 but
I wanted the plaintiff to be able to have her day in court and to have a chance
to prove discrimination (of course, it is not easy to prove). I applied restitution
as follows: The defendant law firm had a gain, the plaintiff's billed hours minus
salary and overhead; she had a loss, her labor and, perhaps, a foregone
lifestyle based upon not being eligible for "the brass ring;" the unjustness was
either the material breach of contract by not honoring the promise ofeligibility
for partnership to have her name in the hat from which names are drawn, or
the fact of discrimination itself. The remedy would be defendant's gain, the
billed hours minus salary and overhead. A breach of contract action would be
more difficult because to recover damages a plaintiffpresumably would have
to prove that she would have made partner and measure what she lost after
mitigation. In restitution, however, the remedy is (or in my view should be)
what the defendant gained, not what the plaintiff lost.

This theory works under The Chart I construct. The question, of course,

28 See supra note 4.

9 Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11 th Cir. 1982).

30 See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
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is whether I am right, or at least whether I can be right some of the time,
particularly in circumstances in which women have been treated unjustly.
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Appendix A-Professor Candace Kovacic-Fleischer's Chart of Teaching
Restitution (pages 674-675)
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Action

Restitution
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Legal:
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Legal:
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Legal
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(other
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